The interesting thing about discontinuity is it happens between when you go to bed and when you wake up the next morning. The first thing I do each day is look at the front page of the newspaper, its how you first discover discontinuity. As written in our soon to be released book, I discovered that Saddam Hussein had invaded Kuwait from the front page of the Washington Post someone was reading across from me in the Metro. My top discontinuity to watch at the moment is Pakistan.

Pakistan: A civil war has broken out in a nuclear-armed country. Pakistan is reaping what it sowed by clandestinely supporting the Taliban and Al Qaeda as leverage over India and Afghanistan. The ISI has been out of control for years and now the Zardari government is trying to put it all back together.  It will be no surprise, but a major discontinuity, if the government falls and Pakistan fragments.

I think it is time to start sorting out US options if Pakistan folds.

Posted by markherman at 10:36 PM EDT

Updated: Sunday, 26 October 2008 10:38 PM EDT

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As the Presidential election comes to a close all eyes and minds are focused on the outcome. It is at times like these that my mind wanders into what happens next? Regardless of who wins there is an inevitable chaos that occurs after an 8 year Presidency. Most of the senior government officials who have shaped and implemented our national security policy move on and a new set of actors takes the stage. Although most of these new leaders will have impressive resumes that make them confirmable, the overall system will suffer from entropy that will require leadership and time to set right.

It is at this time that we are most vulnerable to foreign powers or groups trying and gain leverage in forwarding their agendas. Not all of these maneuvers are threatening to the US, but even those performed by our Allies can diminish our ability to forward our policies. What I will focus on are those situations that are designed to take advantage of the chaos and gain some long term advantage to our detriment.

A good historical model to examine is the Kennedy presidency. In the foreign policy arena Kennedy inherited a long term policy and a short term operation from the Eisenhower administration that tested his foreign policy acumen. The Bay of Pigs was an operation that was on the 'books' that moved toward implementation, regardless of who was in the White House. America's policy in Asia, specifically Vietnam was too low on the administrations agenda to get the level of attention and senior talent to alter its trajectory. Depending on which historical analysis you read the outcome of the Bay of Pigs  had to a lesser or greater degree an impact on Soviet leadership thinking on how to advance their Cold War agenda. This led to the Cuban Missile Crisis and the high point of Kennedy foreign policy achievements.

I believe that the same factors that faced Kennedy are likely to face the next President. There are several wild cards out there that may have a major impact on the trajectory of the next four years. Trying to think through and anticipate some of these possibilities and sorting through reasonable responses is just prudent. Things that I think are possible, hence worth thinking through are:

 1. A major Middle Eastern or SW Asian government falls. Prime candidates are Pakistan and Egypt.

2. Iran tests a nuclear weapon.  Given that Iran is a 'observer nation' in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (PRC and Russia are the founding members) it is likely that this will happen at some point given Russian 'technical' assistance and cooperative efforts by this two powers to block UN counter proliferation initiatives. The question on the table will be, what can the next President do about a nuclear capable Iran? In the non-proliferation category we should not forget the DPRK (North Korea) who misbehave to wring out additional concessions, while never having yet kept any of their agreements.

3. Even if the US is able to implement the recently agreed to security agreement with Iraq, which posits most US forces withdrawing by 2011, there is always Afghanistan and Al Qaeda. How these two  situations evolve is a situation that will have a major impact on the next Presidency.

Thinking about the future, especially when it already knocking at our door, is part and parcel to how the next four years goes. 

Posted by markherman at 10:05 AM EDT

Updated: Sunday, 19 October 2008 10:57 AM EDT

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I hope to begin a conversation on the application of wargames to emerging world class issues, such as National and Corporate survival. I will start by making a simple point, all decisions are based on a set of assumptions. Nothing revelatory about that, but it is this aspect of any decision that in the end determines whether it is a good or a bad one. A good decision is one whose underlying assumptions hold true even as the context under which that decision was made shifts and evolves. A bad decision is one where the shifts or the discontinuities that the decision is subjected to invalidate the underlying assumptions leading to unfortunate circumstances.  Said another way, after every disaster the post mortem reveals someone messed up.

It would be hard to have this discussion without looking at the current Wall Street meltdown. From my perspective this situation failed due to two assumptions, both philosophical. The first was the Government’s assumption that the firms on Wall Street would act in their own self-interest and remain solvent even while taking on enormous portfolio risk. The second was the financial firms belief bordering on hubris that between their professional judgment and their computer models they could shift and weave their way through whatever troubled waters they might encounter.

When I think of the issue of computer models I would make the comment that all models are wrong, some are useful. All computer models are based on their creators’ assumptions as chiseled into computer code on the underlying truths that the simulation is portraying. All computer models are limited by the limits of its programmer. A computer model cannot calculate something its programmer could not anticipate or understand. To put an edge on this point, based on work that we have done, no one that we met in financial institutions believed that the value of real estate would go down. We were successful on several occasions in running wargames where we were able to create plausible scenarios for this to occur and sufficiently suspended the disbelief of the participants so they could grapple with the implications of this alteration of reality.

The current economic crisis makes this point. In an article in the New York Times, October 3^, 2008, titled “Agency’s ’04 Rule Lets Banks Pile Up New Debt And Risk, “ Stephen  Labaton wrote, “A lone voice of dissent in the 2004 proceedings came from a software consultant… who said the computer models run by the firms – which regulators would be relying on – could not anticipate moments of severe market turbulence.” Here is a case where someone, who like myself, has spent a career using computer models knows their inherent limitations. Although computer models are useful, they have their limitations. It has always been my practice to marry computer models with wargames as they are natural compliments to each other. One is a power tool that can crunch numbers until the cows come home, but knowing the correct context and circumstances that those numbers should be crunched under is the province of wargames.

I am happy to say that none of the Wall Street casualties were our clients, but we do not claim to be financial geniuses or Delphic seers. What we would claim is we are very good at forcing people to re-examine their assumptions, no matter how sacrosanct they may appear. More to follow…

Posted by markherman at 7:58 PM EDT

Updated: Friday, 10 October 2008 8:01 PM EDT

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I was at a conference over the last couple of days, so I could not enter into this discussion in any detail as my fingers get tired on a blackberry.

One of the constants in our hobby is when something occurs in a game that doesn't feel right the first reaction is to declare such an occurance 'gamey' (my personal favorite), 'flawed', or 'broken' (without moving parts this is an interesting metaphor). I have no trouble with the expression of personal views, its why people do or do not play a particular title. Where I get cogniative dissonance around is the fact that the statement is made as an ascertain of fact without any facts.

I would like to take a moment to describe the 'suicide' one SP tactic in FTP in historical terms. Playtesting back in the 90's revealed the tactic, so I had to understand it in terms of the war or I would have added rules to eliminate it. In all wargames there is some atomic level unit or said another way every game has a smallest increment of strength below which the game cannot go. Technically this is the level of simulation granularity resident within the design. In FTP the smallest increment is actually the forts with zero SP (representing 2500 gunners), but practically it is one SP (about a division: 6000 men, although this number changed over the course of the war). An issue in any design is how to handle the collision of two atoms in a perverse version of simulation quantum mechanics. Most of these interactions are covered in 7.33 and 7.34, although the rule on General casualties also accomodates this notion.

I checked this once with Dr. John Hatcher (National Park Service Superintendent of the Gettysburg Battlefield) and he tells me that they have not discovered any reason to alter the official view on casualties for this battle. My point being is the factual data on battlefield statistics has not changed in a very long time. As I am working on a new ACW game at this time, I am deeply steeped in the statistics of the war and nothing has changed that would cause me to change the FTP CRT in any manner. If it is flawed it is my mathematical interpretation of the facts. Basically in the ACW both sides in almost every engagement lost about the same number of soldiers. There is variation and some notable exceptions (e.g., Fredericksburg), but this basic fact remains.

It is also true that units rarely fought to the last man, so the CRT is based around an SP being eliminated when losing around 40% of its strength, which is calculated into the CRT in synchronization with the reinforcement and attrition rules to get to a reasonable approximation at any point during a game of how many effective divisions you have on the map. All this was preamble to get to the issue of the how I view an allowed tactic of sequential assaults on a major campaign card.

There are several historical models for this, but I think the 1864 campaign (as noted in an earlier post) is a good instantiation of my point. Now one of the downsides of a manual simulation is simultaneous movement is difficult to portray especially with three activations unless you have three hands. Grant's constructed coordinated advances for numerous forces, but in the East he envisioned an advance in the Valley, from Fort Monroe, and the main force advancing directly on Richmond. The flanking forces were small 'armies', but this is what a major campaign is simulating. And historically each of these forces although advancing more or less in a coordinated fashion were dealt with sequentially by the South in three seperate actions that permanently halted the flank activity and led to a protracted series of flank movements that were successfullly blocked until the siege of Petersburg began. So from my perspective handling a major campaign card as three seperate actions makes reasonable historical sense.

Then there is the issue of being OOS. What does it really mean in this period? First off, 19th century armies are not 20th century armies. At the operational level warfare is non-linear and there is no POL requirement, or artillery shell needs, that ties armies rigidly to lines of communication. There are lines of communication to be certain, but they have a very different impact as the forces do not require regular delivery of supplies to function at full effectiveness (which is why I treat OOS as a positive for the attacker and not a negative for the defender). Again note the fact that Lee at Gettysburg has a LOC (so in FTP terms he is in supply), but there is no rail connection or supply columns moving toward him from some distant base to keep the AoNVa in the field. It should be noted that Richmond and Petersburg fell to the Union not because they were successfully assaulted, but their LOC was about to be cut due to Five Forks and Lee withdrew. That is how 19th century generals dealt with this situation. I would also note that the more aggressive generals in FTP were willing to forgo their LOC on occasion, hence their one rating, which occurred numerous times during the war. Many have commented on the fact that CSA raids, a staple of FTP tactics, would not have occurred because they would be out of supply. Of course the Vicksburg campaign and four CSA invasions of Union territory would seem to dispute this view.

In FTP when a force is OOS, although it is still portrayed as being in a space, in actuality (the spaces are very large areas) the army is dispersed, not necessarily concentrated. So the normal dynamic of a combat whereby both sides lose the same amount of casualties can be altered as the raiding SP in our case is running into a more dispersed force and it is conceivable in this circumstance that they will give more than they get. Again the one SP suicide force is not a bunch of Union soldiers arranged like kamikaze pilots, but a small raiding column that is attacking dispersed foraging columns and catches them in an unconcentrated manner. Once the raiding column loses around 40% of its strength, the column withdraws (in FTP it is removed from the map) to be reconstituted (achieved through the reinforcement process). If you look at the CRT for this interaction on the small battle CRT (the quantum side of a 1sp vs 1sp or such encounter), the losses are usually 1-1 with no losses and the attacker being repulsed. Again a low density fight.

However, in a medium battle, the 1sp force is running into a higher density of enemy forces and a more intense fight is inevitable with the attacking SP being eliminated in every case, although usually only taking an equal number with them. The reason you get a different dynamic is the attacking force is not afforded the luxury of pulling out and a cornered force is much more dangerous than one with a way out, so the defender losses are more substantial. The attacker can get lucky with a six, but overall the attacker without drms loses 5 out of 6 battles, demonstrating the defense dominated nature of ACW combat. As you add drms to the medium CRT you get an array of results based on the ability of one side to shape the battle a bit more (picking and using terrain in a superior manner or catching the defender dispersed in the OOS situation).

Anyway this is a long discussion to say that the use of a major campaign card to conduct sequential attacks on an enemy force to gain advantage is based on a real historical model and the results that occur from this action are supportable from the historical statistics. People do not have to agree with me as most internet conversations do not change minds too often, but I think ascertians need to be debated otherwise they become facts.

Mark

Posted by markherman at 4:23 PM EDT

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I find Don's recent addition to the discussion to be outstanding and I hope he develops it into an article and gets c3i or ATO or whoever to publish it. If he wants I would be happy to host it on my website.

I would like to take a very different tack on what makes a good historical simulation. Don has picked up on the physics side very well, which is very amenable to calculations and data. I would like to say that all of that is necessary but whoefully insufficient.

Decisionsmakers, in this case Lincoln and Davis' and their constituents perception of their physical reality is the dominant variable. What is perceived to be true is in fact true, regardless of the facts until changed by those facts. The reason is that decisions are based on perceived reality not physical reality (the two notions can converge, but the perceived reality always wins). For example how I treated DCs vulnerability in FTP makes this point. Lincoln thought it was vulnerable, but if the game system, as calculated by how the simulation treats the DC defenses, says that it is not vulnerable (and in retrospect it wasn't that vulnerable) then the players are given the luxury of ignoring a key historical cogniative variable. As the Eastern campaign was dominanated by this perception how can leaving it out make for a better historical simulation?

Going to Taylor's point about friction. FTP deals with the activation of leaders using a friction model. Each leader's initiative can be thought of as an amount of standing friction that must be overcome to begin movement. The three rated leaders are harder to move than the one rated leaders because the card deck is not entirely composed of three OC cards. That relationship as represented by card probability and leader rating is a statement of standing friction.

What the leader rating represents is how willing the leader in question was in taking risk, particularly as regards to their logistic preparation. The same real world physics pertained to a McClellan as it did to a Grant. What I mean by that is the needs of a Western soldier were not different than an Eastern soldier, a horse eats what a horse eats etc. (I am a huge fan of Van Creveld's book, even met and talked with him once). However, Grant's perception of what was possible (ability to forage in the deep South) was very different than McClellan's view. A strictly physical simulation, which account for all of the ones used in the DoD (with the exception of mine, search for Entropy Based Warfare) make no allowance for cogniative differences.

The question I would ask how good can a simulation be if it ignores cogniative factors such as the ones I mention (e.g., DC)?

Mark

PS: I broadly agree with Dockter on his point about the enduring value of personality in modern times, but I would note that the rise of the general staff system (just beginning in the ACW period) tends to mitigate the impact of one person on a very large organization. I would say that the impact of a modern leader on an organization is he sets the tone (how aggressive, how spit and polish) which in the aggregate does impact performance, but less so than a Lee sitting on Traveler during a battle. A political struggle due to its very nature, such as Dockter's excellent Triumph of Chaos, tends to elevate the importance of personal leadership as these personages ability to instill purpose into an ideological struggle is critical to its outcome. Witness the current struggle between America and Fundamentalism, its hard to say that icons do not matter in the 21st century.

Posted by markherman at 4:22 PM EDT

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Agreed...

So, is the point that fans do not know what "good" is and only know what they like. Interesting perspective...

Are these mutually exclusive sets or do they intersect?

I have always been amused by the 'gamey' criticism as all rules are 'gamey' by definition, but I understand what is meant. I'll be the first to admit that any game system is not perfect. I also know that a good game has to take a focus. A literal interpretation of the GBOH command system was never intended. In fact the system would work for any tactical system as what it is trying to portray is a deep abstraction and independent of era.

What was in my mind was to create an interactive sequence of play that acted as an extension of the player, through his leaders, to seize and dominate the timing of a battle. In the abstract the two players are trying to time their blows in such a manner as to win the battle. This historical perspective that I am taking in this system is there is a cognitive battle going on as to when you maneuver your various force elements. The superior general controls the tempo of the battle to his advantage. Taking the system literally misses the entire point.

The reason that you go from lowest to highest leader is it forces the poorer led force to show their tactical plan first and give the better leaders the ability to move in relation to their opponents plan whenever they see the time is ripe to do so. The superior generals, ala Alexander, can basically move whenever they want (first, second, last whenever). It allows a player to create complicated sequences of moves where the superior led force tends to gain the tempo and initiative advantage. Of course the dice love no one and there is always a small element of surprise (captures a host of friction of war types of events) that can waylay even the best plans.

As far as the momentum concept goes. How active an element is when it does get going? How well does the leader keep his forces under control? How a player answers these questions through his actions (as represented by dice versus leader capability) deterimines the extent of how effective a given maneuver can be. So a Companion cavalry charge under Alexander can sweep all before it, whereas a lesser light will have difficulties maintaining control and alignment forcing a slower pace and effect of a move. I have seen the criticism that forces once set in motion did not stop etc. However, I designed the entire GBOH system around the idea of relative motion. A force that misses a move is not actually stopped, but its relative motion to the other elements around it is much slower. It is an example of how one can treat time-space relationships in a design without a lot of rules. If one sees the world through a literal lens this is very unsatisfying and there is no way to convince someone with that view otherwise. But the idea that I designed this system to represent what the crtiques state it represents is just incorrect.

The line commands allow the system to give an army some basic capabilities relative to their doctrine, e.g., Roman, whereby any political hack can make a Legion do some basic stuff, but if the battle gets away from them, they have a limited set of options to react.

As I said, no game system is perfect. The GBOH command system is an abstract concept and by definition "gamey" as it is a game that in the aggregate captures the choreography of an ancient battle. It gives advantage to the side with the historically better leaders, but with the opportunity for the player to demonstrate superior gaming skills.

Anyway, I thought it would be fun to throw down some thoughts on what I was trying to do when I designed it this way. I'm sure there are much better Igo-Hugo systems or impulse systems that capture some of these elements in a more palatable manner for some. The notion that popular equates to low brow is a concept that I cannot support, I will leave it to others to make their case on why so many people for over 15 years can be so wrong.

Mark

PS: It would be nice if we can agree up front that neither side will persuade the other that they are right and avoid the part of these discussions where it has to get personal before the discussion can end. I like to think that honest men can disagree.

Posted by markherman at 1:17 AM EST

Updated: Sunday, 3 February 2008 1:18 AM EST

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